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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KDAB, L.L.C., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 980236-CA 
Priority No. 15 
MARGARET JANE GORDON, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
BRIE* APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction of this case pursuant I > > Sect)- •" '^  V *i "•)(j), 
U.C.A. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Did the lower court err in its legal interpretation of a real estai t 
provision concerning the obligations "I llu IMI lies rouniing the exercise of an 
option to pui \ liasi: ii n i H i pi upcrtv'' A trial court's conclusion of law in civil cases 
are reviewed for correctness. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City 
Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah IVSMJ, IIK lam v.urn inrs<T means "the appellate 
court decide itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial 
judge's determination of law. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah l"l.^ l i I In:. 
"correctness" standard applies when a triai 
interpretation of an unambiguous contract. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. 
Co., 868 P.2d 110,112 (Utah App. 1994). 
This issue was preserved in the court below by the plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the accompanying memoranda by both parties. (R. 82-
183). 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action commenced by the plaintiff against the defendant for 
specific performance of a real estate contract concerning property located in 
Tooele, Utah. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDING 
Plaintiff originally filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that as a 
matter of law the defendant had breached the terms of an Option Agreement and 
therefore Plaintiff was entitled to judgment. Both parties filed various memoranda 
and supporting affidavits as to Plaintiffs motion. A hearing was held on October 
7, 1996 before the Honorable L.A. Deaver. 
The lower court issued its decision on December 18, 1996, a copy of which 
is attached in the Appendix to this Brief. The Court denied Plaintiffs motion on 
the basis that, as a matter of law, Defendant did not breach any obligation under 
the contract. This decision was later reduced to a formal order. (R. 187-90). 
Subsequently, the defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing 
that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed since there was 
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no breach of the agreement by the defendant (R. 191-92). The lower court 
agreed and issued an Amended Order of Summary Judgment in favor of the 
defendant and against the plaintiff. (R. 205-08). 
It is from this order that the present appeal is taken. (R. 210-11). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
For purposes of this appeal the facts are undisputed. Although they provide 
useful background information, it is the language of the contract itself which is 
now the issue to be resolved. 
In February of 1992 the defendant, a resident of Tooele County, entered 
into an agreement with a company known as Gordon Farms, Inc. concerning the 
option to purchase certain real property located in Tooele, Utah. A copy of this 
agreement is contained in the Appendix of this Brief. Gordon Farms, Inc. 
exercised the option to purchase approximately twelve acres of the property for 
$93,700. 
On June 17, 1994 the option agreement was assigned by Gordon Farms, 
Inc. to the plaintiff KDAB, L.L.C., which is a limited liability company formed in 
Utah with its principal place of business in Tooele County. Defendant consented 
and accepted this assignment. It was formally recorded on June 20,1994 in the 
Tooele County Recorder's office. 
Plaintiff maintains that pursuant to Section 3 of the Option Agreement they 
extended the option on August 16, 1994 by sending a letter via regular mail to the 
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home of the defendant. The defendant denied ever receiving this notification. 
Since Plaintiff failed to send the notification letter by certified mail as was 
required by the contract, Plaintiff has conceded in this litigation that the 
notification was not properly sent in accordance with the contract requirements 
and therefore cannot be relied upon as a proper notice to exercise the option 
agreement. 
After the assumption of the option contract the plaintiff purchased 
approximately 14 acres of the property for $115,000. The combined purchase of 
Gordon Farms, Inc. and the plaintiff resulted in nearly 26 acres being purchased 
for $208,000. Under paragraph 5(b) of the Option Agreement the rate was to be 
$8,125 per acre even though the actual purchase price was $6,500 per acre as 
stated in paragraph 1. Under the terms of the agreement the plaintiff was required 
to pay 125 percent of the purchase price or $8,125 per acre. This overpayment 
was to be used as a credit to purchase future portions of the property. At the time 
of filing the Complaint, Plaintiff or its predecessor had actually paid for 32 acres 
and was therefore entitled to an additional 6.4 acres. 
In May of 1996 Plaintiff notified the defendant that it wished to purchase 
additional property in accordance with the terms of the Option Agreement. At that 
time Defendant notified Plaintiff that the option was no longer viable since 
Plaintiff had not properly extended the Option Agreement pursuant to paragraph 3 
of the contract. Accordingly, on May 22,1996 Plaintiffs attorney sent a letter to 
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Defendant notifying her of the previous written notice to extend the option mailed 
on August 26, 1994 and once against giving notice of such intention with the May 
22nd letter. 
After several other requests and demands, Defendant refused to appear at a 
title company for the purpose of closing the additional requested purchase of the 
land in dispute. Plaintiff then brought suit against the defendant seeking specific 
performance of the Option Agreement as to the desired purchase in May of 1996 
as well as a request for specific performance of the approximately 6 acres that had 
been prepaid but not delivered. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The plaintiff maintained in the lower court and maintains in this appeal that 
the specific language of the Option Agreement must be enforced regardless of the 
general nature of an ordinary option. In this specific case, paragraph 3 of the 
agreement required that the plaintiff (buyer) could extend the initial period of the 
option in two-year increments by delivering to the seller the sum of $8,125 
together with written notice that the option was being extended. It is undisputed 
that the sum required to be paid was not a fee but was actually a credit requiring a 
1 acre purchase every two years. 
Had Plaintiff sent the August 26, 1994 notification of intent to extend the 
option by certified mail with proof of service upon the defendant, this lawsuit 
would not have occurred. Unfortunately, however, regular mail was utilized and 
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Defendant denied ever receiving such notification. Without more, the failure of 
the plaintiff to properly notify the defendant would extinguish the option right and 
plaintiff would not be able to request specific performance. 
However, this was not an ordinary option agreement. Contained within the 
very same paragraph 3 relating to the extension requirements was a provision 
requiring the defendant to give a notice to the plaintiff of any procedural failure 
relating to the right to extend the option. Accordingly, because Defendant did not 
give Plaintiff an opportunity to cure the defective notification, Plaintiff was 
entitled to correct the notice requirement once Defendant alerted it of the problem. 
As such, therefore, the Agreement is binding upon the defendant and specific 
performance is required. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATER OF LAW 
IN APPLYING GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF OPTION LAW 
RATHER THAN THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE OF THE 
BINDING CONTRACT. 
The heart of this lawsuit and appeal centers around paragraph 3 of the 
Option Agreement. For that reason this paragraph is reproduced for the 
convenience of this Court and the parties. 
3. Option Consideration: Term. The initial period constituting the 
Option shall commence on the date of this Agreement and shall expire at 
5:00 p.m., Salt Lake City time, on November 30, 1994. As consideration 
for Seller granting to Buyer the Option for the initial period constituting the 
Term, Buyer shall pay to Seller the sum of $16,250 on or before December 
1, 1992. Buyer may extend the initial period constituting the Term for four 
(4) additional two (2) year periods by delivering to Seller the following 
6 
sums on or before the commencement of each such extension period, 
accompanied by written notice of such extension: 
First Two-Year Extension $8,125.00 
(On and after December 1, 1994 
through and including 
November 30, 1996) 
Second Two-Year Extension $8,125.00 
(On and after December 1, 1996 
through and including 
November 30, 1998) 
Third Two-Year Extension $8,125.00 
(On and after December 1, 1998 
through and including 
November 30, 2000) 
Fourth Two-Year Extension $8,125.00 
(On and after December 1, 2000 
through and including 
November 30, 2002) 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, no right, title or interest of Buyer 
under this Agreement shall be impaired, terminated or forfeited, including, 
without limitation, the Option or the right to extend the Term, unless and 
until Seller has given Buyer written notice, describing in reasonable detail 
the default or failure concerned (including, without limitation, that Buyer 
has failed to timely pay to Seller any consideration for the extension of the 
Term), and Buyer has failed to cure or remedy any such default or failure 
within thirty (30) days after the receipt by Buyer of such notice. 
For purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment and this appeal, the 
parties have agreed to two facts: (1) in terms of the contract requirement the 
plaintiff failed to properly notify the defendant in August of 1994 of its desire to 
extend the option time since it did not send the notice by certified mail and cannot 
dispute Defendant's denial that it was received; (2) the sum of $8,125.00 is not a 
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fee for the option but is the price for one acres of land pursuant to paragraph 5(b) 
of the Agreement. Thus, this monetary amount requirement would have been 
satisfied had a closing occurred and at least an acre of land purchased at the time 
of closing. 
With this in mind, the only area of dispute addressed by the Court below 
and now on appeal concerns the meaning of the last paragraph of paragraph 3. 
The sole question is whether the defendant was obligated to notify the plaintiff of 
its failure to extend the December 1994 option period and to give the plaintiff a 
thirty-day opportunity to cure. 
Defendant argues that this provision does not apply to the extension of the 
Option Agreement and therefore under the ordinary rules of option construction, 
Defendant had no obligation to notify Plaintiff of a default or failure since the 
decision not to exercise an option is neither a default nor a failure. Under the 
defendant's argument and that of the lower court, because this language did not 
require any action on behalf of the defendant to offer the plaintiff a thirty-day cure 
period, the option expired in 1994-95 when the plaintiff failed to correctly exercise 
it 
Plaintiff disputes this argument and the lower court's reliance upon general 
rules of contract construction. It is Plaintiffs position that because Defendant did 
not notify Plaintiff of its failure to exercise the 1994 option period that it was 
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entitled to cure this deficiency once notice of "failure" was actually given in May 
of 1996 by the defendant 
Plaintiff acknowledges that it is only the specific language contained at the 
conclusion of paragraph 3 which allows it to contest the normal rule regarding 
contractual option agreements. There is no doubt that the decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court in CatmuU v. Johnson, 541 P.2d 793 (Utah 1975) which was relied 
upon by the lower court clearly establishes the normal rule that an optionee, prior 
to acceptance, is not contractually bound to perform any duty. As such, therefore, 
when an optionee fails to exercise an option there is normally no obligation on the 
optionor to take any action whatsoever. The negative action of the optionee, 
therefore, does not require any affirmative action of the optionor. 
However, it is also a basic rule of contract interpretation that the intent of 
the parties is to be determined from the writing itself with each provision being 
considered in relation to all others. Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & 
Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995). Furthermore, a contract interpretation begins 
with the examination of the contract itself to determine the intention of the parties 
and the document should be interpreted in a manner to harmonize all of its 
provisions and terms to the greatest extent possible. Home Savings & Loan v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 817 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1991). 
The concluding paragraph of paragraph 3 of the Agreement is not 
ambiguous. Even though both parties have urged diverse definitions of the 
9 
terminology, this is not sufficient to render the terminology ambiguous. Land v. 
Land 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980). As such, it is the function of this Court to 
determine whether the lower court properly interpreted the contractual terms 
correctly when there was no reliance on extrinsic evidence. Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 
848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1992). In other words, did the lower court properly 
interpret this unambiguous contractual provision? Edwards & Daniels Architects, 
Inc. v. Farmers Properties. Inc., 865 P.2d 1382,1385 (Utah App. 1993). 
A review of the provision itself shows that the lower court erred in its 
interpretation and requires this Court to rule as a matter of law that Plaintiff is 
entitled to specific performance. This assertion is based upon the following. 
First, the contested provision is contained specifically within paragraph 3 
which deals with the schedule of two-year extensions. Had this provision been 
made into a separate paragraph of the Option Agreement, the defendant's 
argument that this provision only took effect once the option had been exercised 
could be more logically made. However, its location within paragraph 3 itself 
clearly shows that it was intended to apply to the "exercise" provisions of that 
paragraph regardless of any residual effect it may have on the remainder of the 
contract. 
Second, the plain meaning of the words must be given effect by this Court. 
It is basic hornbook law that the terms of a contract are to be interpreted in 
accordance with their usually accepted meanings and should be read as a whole in 
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an attempt to harmonize and give effect to all contractual provisions. Nielsen v. 
O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992). This Court has held that the ordinary 
meaning of contract terms is often best determined through a standard non-legal 
dictionary. Warburton v. Virginia Beach Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 899 P.2d 
779 (Utah App. 1995). As such, examination of the words themselves requires 
that the cure provision applies to the failure to exercise the option. 
The phrase "no right, title or interest of buyer" clearly applies to the 
exercise of the option extension. The term "right" is defined as "that to which one 
has a just claim; any power or privilege vested in a person by the law." Webster's 
New Collegiate Dictionary, 6th Ed. Likewise, the word "interest" is defined as a 
"right, title, or share in a thing, participation in advantage, profit and 
responsibility." Id. As such, these words clearly apply to Plaintiffs right and 
interest in being able to periodically extend the option time in which to purchase 
the property. 
Furthermore, the language of the contract itself specifically mentions this 
right of extension. It states: '^ Notwithstanding the foregoing, no right, title, or 
interest of Buyer under this agreement... including . . . the option or the right to 
extend the term...." (Emphasis added). Thus, the third line of the provision 
specifically regards the plaintiffs "right to extend the term" as a protected "right" 
or "interest" under the first line of the provision. 
n 
Next, the provision prohibits this right from being "impaired, terminated or 
forfeited." The term "forfeited" is especially germane to the facts of this case. It 
is defined as "to lose, or lose the right to, by some error, fault, offense, or crime." 
Id. There can be no question that the lower court essentially held that because the 
plaintiff did not properly notify the defendant of its right to extend the option that 
it "forfeited" that right and therefore cannot now require specific performance of 
the contract. The fact that the option gives the plaintiff the right to decide whether 
or not it will enter into a future enforceable contract is immaterial to this provision. 
It is the "right" of the plaintiff to make this choice by properly exercising the 
notification requirement which is protected. 
Third, the language of the provision requires that the defendant give written 
notice to the plaintiff in reasonable detail of "the default or failure concerned." 
(Emphasis added). This phrase is further defined in parentheses by stating 
"including, without limitation, that buyer has failed to timely pay to seller any 
consideration for the extension of the term." (Emphasis added). Here, the word 
"failure" is completely applicable to the facts of this transaction. Defendant 
herself in her Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion For Summary 
Judgment stated the following: 
The plaintiff attempts to argue that the failure to give the required 
notice should be considered a default and a cure period be allowed. It is 
well accepted law that the failure to exercise an option is not a default and 
no default is claimed or suggested by the defendant. (R. 151). (Emphasis 
added). 
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Thus, the "failure" of the plaintiff to send proper notice is included within 
the scope of the provision giving opportunity to cure. The defendant argued below 
that the fact that the limiting parenthetical expression referred to payment only 
necessarily excluded notification. (Oct. 7, 1996 Hearing, pp. 15-16). However, 
Defendant's counsel failed to address the Without limitation" modifier within that 
phrase which clearly expands the "failure" to include "failure to give notice". 
The lower court based its decision upon basic principles of options and not 
upon the specific language of the provision entered into by the parties. The plain 
meaning of these words in context of their location to the entire agreement 
requires this Court to find as a matter of law that the cure provision was 
applicable. Upon learning of the defective notice of 1994, Plaintiff gave proper 
notice of intent to exercise the option within the 30-day cure period. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the lower court concerning the obligations of the parties in 
a normal option agreement would have been correct were it not for the specific 
language contained at the end of paragraph 3. The parties clearly modified the 
various obligations and duties in an option environment by requiring an affirmative 
duty by the defendant to advise the plaintiff that they had failed to exercise their 
right of option extension. This shift of burden was fully agreed to by both parties 
when they executed the agreement. The lower court exceeded its authority by 
rewriting this provision in terms of general law rather than the intent of the parties. 
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This Court should reverse that decision and order specific performance of the 
Option Agreement. 
DATED this 12th day of June, 1998. 
X>tiw^ 
Craig S. Cool 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
3645 East Cascade Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant to George Daines, Esq., 108 North Main, Suite 200, Logan, Utah 
84321 this 12th day of June, 1998. 
yQA4sU\d' Pd^n^ 
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APPENDIX 
OPTION AGREEMENT 
[Margaret Jane Gordon] 
TIIISN OPTION AGREEMENT (this "Agreement") is entered into as 
of the /\\Y day of February, 1992, between MARGARET JANE GORDON, 
an individual ("Seller"), whose address is 151 South Coleman, 
Tooele, Utah 84074, and GORDON FARM, INC, a Utah corporation 
("Buyer"), whose address is 480 East 6400 South,' Murray, Utah 
84107. 
FOR THE SUM OF TEN DOLLARS ($10-00) and other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are 
acknowledged, Seller and Buyer agree as follows: 
1. Definitions. Each of the following terms shall have the 
indicated meaning: 
"Closing" means, collectively, the closing(s) of the 
purchase and sale of any portion of the Property between Seller and 
Buyer, which may occur from time to time in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement* (Under this Agreement, Buyer may, 
at its option, purchase all of the Property at one time, or, as is 
anticipated, may from time to time purchase any portion of the 
Property equal to or greater than two (2) acres in the first' 
purchase, and equal to or greater than one (1) acre in any 
subsequent purchase.) 
"Closing Date" means the date on which any Closing 
occurs. 
"Deed" means a general warranty deed, dated as of the 
relevant Closing Date, conveying and warranting to Buyer good, 
marketable and indefeasible fee simple'title to that portion of 
the Property then being purchased, free and clear of all liens, 
encumbrances and other matters, except for the Permitted 
Exceptions, 
"Option" mecins the option granted to Buyer in Paragraph 
2 to purchase all or any portion of the Property. 
"Permitted Exceptions" means, collectively, non-
delinquent real property taxes and assessments and the following: 
(i) right-of-way for County Road along the North 
16.5 feet, more or less; 
(ii) various pole line easements in favor of Utah 
Power and Light Company, recorded in the Tooele County Recorder's 
Office in Book C of Miscellaneous at Pages 4 62 and 4 63, in Book G 
of Miscellaneous at Page 41, in Book 44 at Page 409 and in Book 100 
at Pages 621 and 623; 
(iii) various easements in favor of Tooele City, 
EXHIBIT 
recorded in the Tooele County Recorder's Office in Book 77 at Page 
122, in Book 125 at Page 508 and in Book 101 at Page 002; 
(iv) right-of-way easement in favor of Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Company, recorded in the Tooele. 
County Recorder's Office in Book 183 at Page 942; and 
(v) reservation in patents wl-u- ceads in part as 
follows: "subject to all rights of way for ditches, tunnels and 
telephone and transmission lines that may have been constructed by 
authority of the United States." 
"Property11 means, collectively, the parcels of land 
located in Tooele county, Utah, more particularly described as 
follows, together with all structures and other improvements 
located on such land, and all appurtenant easements and 
rights-of-way and all other appurtenances in any way appertaining 
to such land, including, without limitation, all oil, gas, water 
and mineral rights, and all righb, title and interest of Seller in 
and to any land lying in the bed of any street, road, avenue or 
alley, whether open, closed or proposed, and any strips and gores, 
in front of or adjoining such land: 
PARCEL l: 
Beginning at a point 16.5 feet South of the 
Northeast corner of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 
4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence 
South 2611.51 feet; thence South 89'44,38n West 1062.325 
feet; thence North 2 612*61 feet, more or less; thence 
North BgMO'll11 East 1062.325 feet to beginning, 
LESS AND EXCEPTING: Beginning at a point 16-5 feet 
South and 09MB'll" West 1062.325 feet from the Northeast 
corner of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
290.4 feet; thonce North 89M8!11" East 150 feet; thence 
North 290-4 feet; thence South 89 • 48!11" West 150 feet 
to the point of beginning* 
PARCEL 4: 
Beginning at a point 4085-65 feet West along the 
North line of Section 34 and South 1043,55 feet, more or 
less, from the Northeast corner of Section 34, Township 
3 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence West 208.71 feet; thence South 1588*90 
feet, more or less; thence West 208*71 feet; thence North 
1588.90 feet, mora or less? thencG East 208.71 feet to 
the point of beginning. 
"Purchase Price" means the sum of $6,500.00 per acre 
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actually purchased. (The Purchase Price for any fractional acre 
shall be determined by multiplying the sum of $6,500.00 by such 
fraction. For example, if that portion of the Property then being 
purchased is land with an area of 1.5 acres, the Purchase Price 
for such portion would be $9,750,00 (1.5 X $6,500.00).) 
"Surveyfs)n means, collectively, one or more current 
certified boundary survey(s) of all or any portion of the Property, 
prepared by a registered land surveyor in accordance with the land 
survey requirements of the State of Utah, as well as any other 
reasonable requirements of Buyer. 
"Term" means the initial period of the Option, as the 
same may be extended, as set forth in Paragraph 3. 
"Title Company11 means Associated Title Company, a Utah 
corporation, whose address is 563 West 500 South, Suite 160, 
Bountiful, Utah 04010. 
,fTitle Policy" means an ALTA owner's so-called "extended 
coverage" title policy (6-1-90 form, as amended), issued by First 
American Title Insurance Company through the Title Company pursuant 
to the Commitment for Title Insurance, dated December 17, 1991, 
Order No. T-91-2390-Amendi|l, as the same may have been or may be 
amended, covering that portion of the Property then being 
purchased, containing none of the usual printed "standard 
exceptions," having liability limits equal to the Purchase Price 
being paid for that portion of the Property then being purchased, 
insuring indefeasible fee title to such portion as being vested in 
Buyer, subject only to the Permitted Exceptions, deleting by 
endorsement Paragraphs 7(b) and 14 from the Conditions and 
Stipulations, and containing such endorsements as may be reasonably 
requested by Buyer. (Notwithstanding the foregoing, Buyer may 
elect to receive a standard coverage title policy, subject to the 
usual printed standard exceptions, for all or any portion of the 
Property.) 
2, Option. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, 
Seller grants to Buyer an option during the Term to purchase all 
or any portion(s) of the Property for the Purchase Price. Buyer 
may exercise such option to purchase portions of the Property at 
as many different Closings as Buyor may elect, provided that at the 
first closing, Buyer must purchase at least two (2) acres of the 
Property, and at any subsequent Closing, Buyer must purchase at 
least one (1) acre of the Property. Buyer may exercise the Option 
from time to time and at any time during the Term by giving Seller 
written notice of such exercise, specifying which portion of the 
Property Buyer wishes to purchase with respect to each such 
exercise. 
3- Option Considerationr Term, The initial period 
constituting the Option shall commence on the date of this 
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Agreement and shall expire at 5:00 p.m., Salt Lake City time, on 
November 30, 1994* As consideration for Seller granting to Duyer 
the Option for the initial period constituting the Term, Buyer 
shall pay to Seller the sum of $16,250.00 on or before December 1, 
1992. Buyer may extend the initial period constituting the Term 
for four (4) additional two (2) year periods by delivering to 
Seller the following sums on or before the commencement of each 
cuch extension period, accompanied by written notice of such 
extension: 
First Two-Year Extension $0,125.00 
(On and after December 1, 1994 
through and including 
November 30, 1996) 
Second Two-Year Extension $0,125.00 
(on and after December 1, 1996 
through and including 
November 3 0, 199 0) 
Third Two-Year Extension $0/125.00 
(On and after December 1, 1998 
through and including 
November 30, 2 000) 
Fourth Two-Year Extension $0,125.00 
(On and after December 1; 2000 
through and including 
November 30, 2 002) 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, no right, title or interest of 
Buyer under this Agreement shall- be impaired, terminated or 
forfeited, including, without limitation, the Option or the right 
to extend the Term, unless and until Seller has given Buyer written 
notice, describing in reasonable detail the default or failure 
concerned (including, without limitation, that Buyer has failed to 
timely pay to Seller any oonsideration for the extension of the 
Term), and Buyer has failed to cure or remedy any such default or 
failure within thirty (3 0) days after the receipt by Buyer of such 
notice. 
4. Accp.yis; • Developmont Cooperation. Seller shall assist 
and cooperate with Buyer and Buyer's representatives in obtaining 
access to the Property from time to time for the purpose of making 
inspections, surveys and soils, environmental and other studies of 
the Property as reasonably required by Buyer, to be made at Buyer1s 
expense. From time to time, Seller shall, at Buyer's request and 
expense, execute any requests, petitions or applications for zoning 
or use changes, any subdivision, dedication or other plats and any 
other plats, documents, instruments or agreements necessary or 
appropriate to enable Buyer to develop all or any portion of the 
Property as a residential development for condominiums, single or 
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multiple family dwellings or other residential dwellings and 
related structures and improvements, as may be determined by Buyer. 
Seller shall have no liability to Buyer if, despite Seller's 
reasonable cooperation, any such requests, petitions or 
applications are denied. 
5. Closing. If Buyer timely exercises the Option with 
respect to any portion of the Property, the Closing for such 
portion shall occur at the Title Company as soon as reasonably 
practicable after\Seller receives notice of such exercise. (It is 
contemplated that Buyer will exercise the Option as to portions of 
the Property from time to time, in increments of two (2) acres or 
more at the first closing, and in increments of one (1) acre^or 
more at any subsequent Closing.) At each Closing, the following 
shall occur: 
(a) Seller shall deliver to Buyer the Deed and a so-
called "non-foreign affidavit," both duly exeouted and acknowledged 
by Seller, and shall cause the Title Policy to be delivered to 
Buyer; 
(b) Buyer shall deliver or cause to be delivered to 
Seller one hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the Purchase 
Price, based on the actual amount of acreage then being purchased 
(to be established by Buyer1s surveyor or engineer), reduced by all 
consideration paid by Buyer to Seller pursuant to Paragraph 3 to 
the extent that such consideration has not previously been credited 
to Buyer in any prior Closing? 
(c) Seller and Buyer shall instruct the Title Company 
to record the Deed in favor of Buyer, and to record all other 
documents, including, without limitation, deeds of reconveyance and 
releases of liens, necessary for title to that portion of the 
Property then being purchased to be conveyed to Buyer free and 
clear of all liens, encumbrances and other matters, except for the 
Permitted Exceptions, on satisfaction of all of the conditions of, 
and requirements for, such Closing sot forth in this Agreement; 
(d) Seller and Buyer shall each provide to the Title 
Company or other closing agent any information and materials 
reasonably necessary to enable such closing agent to comply with 
the real ostate transaction reporting requirements of Section 6045 
of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended; and 
(e) seller and Buyer shall deliver to the Title company 
and to each other such further documents and instruments as may be 
reasonably necessary or appropriate to consummate the transactions 
contemplated by this Agreement. 
6- Conveyance of Balance of Property. 
(a) As set forth in Paragraph 5(b), at any Closing, 
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Seller will receive one hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the 
Purchase Price for that portion of the Property being purchased. 
Therefore, as of the first Closing, Seller will have received 
moneys in excess of the Purchase Price of the Property conveyed to 
Buyer, and the amount of such excess moneys will be increased as 
of any subsequent closing. Such excess moneys shall be handled in 
accordance with the remainder of this Paragraph 6. 
(b) Buyer may, at any time, give Seller written notice 
that Buyer has elected to terminate this Agreement, As of the 
expiration of the%Term or any sooner termination of this Agreement 
(whether as • a result of the notice given pursuant to the 
immediately preceding sentence or for any other reason), Buyer may 
elect to apply some or all of such excess moneys and/or any 
consideration paid by Buyer to Seller pursuant to Paragraph 3 (to 
the extent that such consideration has not previously been credited 
to Buyer in any prior Closing) to the purchase of any portion of 
the Property not purchased as of the date of such expiration or 
sooner termination- Buyer shall set forth such election in a 
writing delivered to Seller, and Seller shall promptly comply with 
the election made by Buyer, 
(c) If Buyer elects to apply some or all of such ^xcas;^ 
moneys or such consideration to the purchase of such portion of the 
Property, Seller shall, without any additional consideration being 
paid, convey such portion to Buyer. If such excess moneys and/or 
consideration are less than the Purchase Price of such portion of 
the Property, Buyer shall pay the balance of the Purchase Price for 
such portion concurrently with the conveyance of such portion to 
Buyer, but shall not be required to pay any amount in excess of the 
Purchase Price of such portion. (That is, the one hundred twenty-
five percent (125%) factor shall not apply.) Such conveyance shall 
otherwise be consummated in accordance wren rne provisions or this 
Agreement applicable to any Closing, 
7, Prorations. Subject to the immediately following 
sentence, ad valorem and any other general or special taxes on or 
allocable to that portion of the Property then beiiig purchased that 
are due and payable in the calendar year in which the relevant 
Closing Date falls shall be prorated as of such Closing Date* At 
or prior to any closing, Seller shall pay in full all ,frollback 
taxes" payable on or after such Closing under the Farmland 
Assessment Act due to a chango in use of that portion of the 
Property then being purchased, and any general or special 
assessments that are a lien against or allocable to such portion. 
If taxes or any other items are prorated as of any Closing on any 
basis other than actual amounts charged for the current period, or 
if a reassessment of taxes occurs which relates to the calendar 
period in which the relevant Closing Date occurs, such items shall 
be reprorated on receipt of such actual amounts or on such 
reassessment and the party owing funds to the other shall promptly 
remit such funds to the other• If the party owing such funds to 
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the other fails to remit such funds within thirty (30) days after 
demand, such funds shall bear interest, commencing on the date such 
demand is made, at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum. 
8. Closing Costs. Seller shall pay for the standard 
coverage portion of the Title Policy, and Buyer shall pay for the 
additional cost of insurance over the usual printed standard 
exceptions (that is, for the extended coverage portion of the Title 
Policy), if Buyer does not elect to receive a standard coverage 
title policy. Seller and Buyer shall share egually the escrow 
charges of the Title Company, and recording costs and any other 
amounts shall be customarily allocated* Buyer shall pay for any 
Survey(s) ordered by Buyer, 
9. Possession; frisk of Loss. Possession of that portion of 
the Property then being purchased shall be transferred by Seller 
to Buyer on the relevant closing Date. Until each Closing is 
consummated v/ith respect to any particular portion of the Property, 
the risk of loss to such portion shall be borne solely by Seller. 
10* Sellerfs Representations, Warranties and. Covenants. 
Seller makes the following representations, warranties and 
covenants for the benefit of Buyer, which are true as of the date 
of this Agreement, shall be true as of each Closing Date with 
respect to that portion of the Property then being purchased and 
shall survive the Closing: 
(a) No hazardous substances, hazardous wastes, 
pollutants or contaminants are or have at any time been used, 
deposited, stored, disposed of, placed or otherwise located in or 
on, or released from, the Property or any facility operated on the 
Property, Seller has received no notice, and is not aware that 
any notice to any other person has been given, of any violation or 
claimed violation of any law, ordinance, rule or regulation 
relating to hazardous substances, hazardous wastes, pollutants or 
contaminants, and neither Soller nor the Property is in violation 
of any such law, ordinance, rule or regulation. No underground 
tank for storage of gasoline or othor purpose is located on the 
Property-
(b) Wardley Better Homes and Gardens/Ila Sprouse and 
Allsop Realty and Appraising/William L. Allsop are the only real 
estate brokers/agents which may be involved in this transaction and 
may have been retained by Seller. Any compensation due to such 
brokers/agents as a result of this Agreement or any Closing is and 
shall be the exclusive responsibility of Seller, and Buyer shall 
have no liability or responsibility for such compensation• Seller 
shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Buyer from and against 
all claims, liabilities, causes of action, costs and expenses 
(including, without limitation, attorneys1 fees) arising from any 
claim by any person for any brokerage fee, finder's foe or other 
similar fee related to the sale or attempted sale of the Property 
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to Buyer, unless Buyer has entered intP & written brokerage 
commission agreement with such person. 
11. Attorneys1 Fees, If either Seller or Buyer brings suit 
the breach of a covenant, representation of warranty contained in 
this Agreement or with respect to any other issue relating to this 
Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from 
the other party such prevailing party's reasonable attorneys1 fee3 
and costs incurred in any such action or in any appeal from such 
action, in addition to the other relief to which the prevailing 
party is entitled, 
12. Notices. Any notice or demand to be given by Seller or 
Buyer to the other shall be given in writing by personal service, 
telegram, express mail, Federal Express, DtfL or any othor similar 
form of courier or delivery service, or mailing in the United 
States mail/ postage prepaid, certified, return receipt requested 
and addressed to such party as follows: 
ij_tn Seller: 
Margaret Jane Gordon 
151. So\itA\ Coleafc^ Yv 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
If to Buyer: 
Gordon Farm, Inc. 
400 East 6400 South 
Murray, Utah 04107 
Attention: R. Kent Buie, President 
With a required copy to: 
Victor A. Taylor, Esq. 
Kimball, Parr,, Waddoups, Brown & Gee 
105 South Sbate Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Either Seller or Buyer may change the address at which such party 
desires to receive notice on written notice of such change to the 
other partsY* Any such notice ahull be doomed to have been given, 
and shall be effective, on delivery to the notice address then 
applicable for the party to which the notice is directed; provided, 
hov/ever, that refusal to accept delivery of a notice or the 
inability to deliver a notice because of an address change which 
was not properly communicated shall not defeat or delay the giving 
of a notice. 
13. Memorandum of Option. Concurrently with the execution 
of this Agreement, Sailer and Buyar shall enter into original 
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counterparts of a recordable memorandum or short form of this 
Agreement, in form and substance mutually acceptable to Seller and 
Buyer, reflecting the basic terms and conditions of this Agreement 
(other than the Purchase Price) • Buyer may, at its expense, record 
such memorandum or short form in the official records of the Tooele 
County Recorder. 
14. General'Provisions. A modification of, or amendment to, 
any provision contained in this Agreement shall be effective only 
if the modification or amendment is in writing and signed by both 
Seller and Buyer. Any oral representation or modification 
concerning this Agreement shall be of no force or effect. This 
Agreement shall inure to the benefit of, and be binding on, Seller 
and Buyer and their respective heirs, personal representatives, 
successors and assigns. This Agreement shall be governed by, and 
construed and interpreted in accordance with, the lavs (excluding 
the choice of laws rules) of the state of Utah. This Agreement 
shall be construed according to its fair meaning and not strictly 
for or against Seller or Buyer, as if both Seller and Buyer had 
prepared it. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of 
the parties to this Agreement and supersedes all previous 
contracts, correspondence and documentation relating to the subject 
matter of this Agreement. 
SELLER AND BU^ER have executed this Agreement on the 
respective dates set forth below, to be effective as of the date 
first set forth above. 
SELLER: 
>iARGAJ}ET JANE^ORDON 
Date j2 Z- ^'£>4r" , 
! ^ ^ 
PUYER: 
GORDON TARM, INC. 
By i£ 
R. Kent Buie 
P r e s i d e n t 
Date Z&ML 
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3R04USTR«CT COURT-TOOELE 
^96DEC 18 Afc#32 
FILED BYJH 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KDAB, L.C. 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
MARGARET JANE GORDON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No: 960300025 CV 
Judge L. A. Dever 
This matter came on for Summary Judgment hearing on October 7,1996. At the 
conclusion of the evidence the parties asked to submit post hearing memoranda. 
Defendants' memorandum was received on October 15,1996, and the plaintiffs 
memorandum was received on October 23,1996. Although no Notice to Submit has 
been received, the Court will treat the matter as having been submitted. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The parties entered into a contract for the sale of land in Tooele. The contract 
provided that the plaintiff had the right to exercise the option to purchase the property 
in a piecemeal fashion. The contract had a provision for the plaintiff to exercise an 
option on a periodic basis. The parties agree that the plaintiff failed to exercise its 
option in August of 1994. The plaintiff contends that because the defendant failed to 
notify the plaintiff it was in default that the contract is still in force. The defendant 
contends that she had no obligation to notify the plaintiff that it failed to exercise the 
option. There are no facts that are in dispute in this matter. 
The Court concludes as a matter of law that the plaintiff is not bound to exercise 
an option to purchase and therefore cannot be in default for not exercising the option. 
If the plaintiff is not in default, the defendant has no obligation to give the plaintiff notice 
to cure or risk termination of the contract because this obligation only arises if the 
plaintiff is in default. 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on causes 1 through 3 is denied. No 
objection to summary judgment on cause 4 being made, summary judgment on that 
cause is granted. 
Each side to bear their own costs and fees. Counsel for defendant to prepare 
the appropriate order. 
Dated this 17th day of December, 1996. 
L^u3ff l«3udge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed 
this ,_ day of December, 1996, to the following: 
Scott A. Broadhead N. George Daines 
250 South Main St 108 North Main, Ste 200 
Tooele, UT 84074 Logan, UT 84321 
v);:x^ Qlh/am^ 
Deputy Court Cterk 
#33-rfOb 
N. George Daines (0803) 
BARRETT & DAINES 
108 North Main, Suite 200 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-4000 
/f/kj 1J 
." ' ~H 
r-> .. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KDAB, L.C. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARGARET JANE GORDON, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960300025 
THIS MATTER came before the court on the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Defendant also moved for Summary Judgment on these same issues. Each party 
submitted briefs and the court heard oral argument concerning the issues on October 15, 
1996. Thereafter each party further supplemented the record with written memorandums. 
The court issued its Order on December 18,1996, wherein it directed Defendant's counsel to 
prepare an Order to implement its decision. After a further hearing this Amended Order was 
approved by the court and counsel. 
The court finds that there are no material disputed facts which would preclude it from 
entering summary judgment on the Motion for Summary Judgment. The court, based upon 
the uncontested facts before it, enters its determinations as follows: 
1. That the parties or their successors in interest entered into the Option Agreement 
attached to Plaintiffs Complaint as Exhibit A. 
2. That the Option Agreement provided that the Plaintiff had the right to exercise the 
option to purchase the property in a piecemeal fashion on a periodic basis. 
3. That the Plaintiff failed to exercise its option to obtain the First Two-Year 
Extension as required by Section 3, which requires payment of additional funds, written 
notice and service of that notice. 
4. That the Plaintiff contends that Plaintiffs failure to exercise its option to obtain 
the First Two-Year Extensions was a default by it. Plaintiff further contends that because 
the Defendant failed to notify the Plaintiff of this default the Option Agreement is still in 
effect. 
5. That the Defendant denies both of the contentions of the Plaintiff and urges that 
the Option Agreement has expired by its own terms. 
6. The court concludes as a matter of law that the Plaintiff is not bound to exercise an 
option to purchase and therefore cannot be in default for not exercising the option to obtain 
the First Two-Year Extension or any other extensions and, thus, the Option to Purchase 
2 
Agreement has expired by its own terms. 
7. The court finds that the Defendant has no obligation to provide a notice of default 
to Plaintiff when it fails to exercise such options. 
8. That Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on the First, Second and Third 
Causes of Action is denied. 
9. That Defendant is entitled to Summary Judgment that Plaintiffs First, Second and 
Third Causes of Action be dismissed. 
10. That Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as to its Fourth Cause of Action 
is conceded by Defendant and based upon that concession, summary judgment thereon is 
awarded to the Plaintiff. 
11. That the parties are directed to determine the purchase moneys to be credited 
toward additional land purchases and the legal description of said land to be released by 
Defendant and prepare a Stipulation to that effect. If the parties are unable to agree then a 
supplemental court hearing on this matter should be requested. 
12. That Defendant's First, Second and Third Causes of Action are resolved by the 
court's decisions with respect to Plaintiffs Causes of Action inasmuch as this decision quiets 
title to the remaining property of Defendant, and given the relief ordered the court will not 
assess damages for slander of title. 
13. That all Causes of Action by and between the parties are hereby resolved. 
3 
14. Each pj^ rty shall bear their own attorneys fees and costs. 
DATED 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
YOUNG & BROADHEAD 
5tt A. Broadhead " 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER postage 
prepaid, July 29, 1997, to the following: 
Scott A. Broadhead (#6501) 
YOUNG & BROADHEAD 
250 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 87 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
Secretary 
